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W hat does the world success of Piketty’s Capital in the 21st 
Century (2014) reveal? This book 
is not just one of the most aston-
ishing bestsellers in the social 
sciences in recent years, but it may 
also signal an important shift in 
the way we consider inequality in 
economics and sociology, in the 
social sciences and the public are-
na, in political debate and day-to-
day conversations. 
Piketty warns the reader that 
the book should not be considered 
a one-off one-man opus. It is the 
sediment of a decade of collective 
research involving many scholars, 
including Anthony Atkinson, Em-
manuel Saez, Gabriel Zucman, 
Gilles Postel-Vinay, and Facundo 
Alvaredo. It started at the turn of 
the millennium with publications 
about the evolution of income ine-
quality during the course of a cen-
tury in the United States and France 
(Piketty and Saez, 2001 & 2003; 
Piketty, 2001 & 2003). Piketty and 
Saez’s 2001 NBER Working Paper 
(published in 2003 in the Quarterly 
Journal of Economics) made the re-
turn of inequality in the United 
States visible to many through an 
extremely simple and striking 
U-shaped graph plotting the in-
come share of the top one percent, 
which peaked at 20% in 1928, 
dropped after World War II, stabi-
lized at a low of 8% in the early 
1970s, and grew rapidly in the 
1980s and 1990s, reaching 14% in 
1998. This single graph helped to 
definitively bury Kuznets’ (1955) 
optimistic argument of an inverted 
U-shaped evolution of inequality 
under capitalism: low before the 
Industrial Revolution, very high 
during it, and decreasing in the 
post-industrial era. 
Although this simple mes-
sage may seem revolutionary not 
only in political terms, but also as 
a groundbreaking scientific con-
tribution, it was not that novel. The 
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data (US tax data), the method (top income shares), 
and the result (the return of income inequality) could 
already be found in previous works (Kuznets and Jenks, 
1953; Feenberg and Poterba, 1993; Cutler and Katz, 
1992). So how did Piketty et al.’s incremental innova-
tions – e.g. greater historical depth, a more homogene-
ous dataset, a richer description of top incomes, a de-
composition of the respective contribution of wages 
and property income – become a turning point in the 
social sciences? It is not merely because this research, 
which may only have been incrementally innovative in 
regard to our knowledge of the United  States in 2001, 
led to the establishment of ignored facts when replicat-
ed in other countries – China, India, Germany, and so 
on – and led to the development of a 
unique comparative dataset on world 
income and wealth inequalities. It is 
also because it helped to shift the way 
we view inequality in the distribution 
of affluence, whether in terms of in-
come, wages, or wealth. 
The top one 
percent and 
statistical measures 
of inequality
Asking whether inequality has in-
creased or decreased seems like a fairly 
simple question that should have a 
simple and unequivocal answer. How-
ever, it requires a statistical compari-
son of not just two distinct figures, but 
two full distributions. Answers might 
differ depending on the area one focus-
es on most (top, middle, or bottom) 
and on the metric that one prioritizes 
in order to summarize a full distribu-
tion. This is the famous problem of 
Lorenz curves comparisons. The “Gini 
coefficient” (1921) is notoriously fa-
mous for being an all-encompassing 
measure that solves this comparison 
puzzle. As shown in Figure 1, it is one 
of the most used statistical measures of 
inequality, and it has enjoyed rapid 
growth, especially in the 1960s and 
1970s. The fact that it could be imple-
mented easily on limited samples of 
the population contributed to its adop-
tion. However, it was criticized for not 
being decomposable and not being fully in line with 
basic axioms of welfare theory (Atkinson, 1970), which 
led to alternative inequality coefficients (i.e. the Theil 
and Atkinson coefficients). Nevertheless, those coeffi-
cients share with the Gini the fact that they overlook 
the heterogeneity in the evolution of inequality at dif-
ferent levels of the income distribution. 
In contrast, the Piketty et al. approach to ine-
quality contributed to fully tackling the heterogeneity 
of the inequality evolutions: the rhythm of the evolu-
tion of the top one percent share might differ from 
that of the F95-99 or the F90-95. Without formulating 
any explicit criticisms of other measures, it provided 
the level of detail required to turn the quest for a per-
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Inequality AND (income OR wealth OR fortune OR capital OR wage OR salary OR pay)
… AND  "Lorenz curve"
… AND  ("Gini index" OR "Gini coefficient")
… AND  ("Theil index" OR "Theil coefficient")
… AND  ("Atkinson index" OR "Atkinson coefficient")
… AND ("D9/D1" OR "D9 to D1" OR decile ratio OR interdecile ratio)
… AND share AND  ("top 1 percent" OR "top one percent" OR "top 1%") 
… AND share AND  ("top 0.1 percent" OR "top 0.1%") 
Piketty & Saez (2001)
Piketty (2001)
Figure 1. Statistical concepts used to approach inequality
Note and source: I collected the number of references published each decade that are listed on 
Google Scholar. I used the keywords inequality AND (income OR wealth OR fortune OR capital OR 
wage OR salary OR pay) as the baseline search, to which I added various statistical concepts on the 
measure of inequality. Hence, the Google Scholar search on the “top one percent share” concept 
was inequality AND (income OR wealth OR fortune OR capital OR wage OR salary OR pay) AND share 
AND (“top 1 percent” OR “top one percent” OR “top 1%”).
Google Scholar is a publication database based on Google’s automated collecting of academic 
references in online scientific books and articles. It therefore comes with some limitations, including 
imprecise, undefined, and potentially inconsistent temporal coverage and some referencing 
errors, especially dating errors, especially for the earliest decades. However, besides being free of 
charge and easy to use, Google Scholar has the great advantage of providing a comprehensive 
list of publications, including books (Harzing and van der Val 2008). This graph has been included 
mainly to compare the evolution of the use of different measures of inequality. Absolute levels and 
evolutions where the number of references <10 should be treated with caution.
* The number of references for the full decade 2011–2020 has been estimated by multiplying the
actual number of publications for 2011–August 2017 (6.5 years) by 1.54 (=10/6.5).
fect all-encompassing measure of inequality into an 
unnecessary illusion. 
By focusing on the top of the affluence distribu-
tion, the Piketty et al. approach also uncovered a skewed 
world that had largely been ignored, especially when one 
used the more traditional inter-decile ratios: the gap 
separating the richest of the rich from the rest of the rich 
is as large as the one separating the rich from the rest of 
the population. Hence, the Piketty et al. approach not 
only popularized a “top one percent share” measure of 
inequality – which had already been abundantly used by 
Kuznets and Jenks (1953) – but even more importantly, 
it promoted a “top 0.1% share” (and “top 0.01% share”) 
measure of inequality that had been very rare before 
their work (Figure 1). Thanks to the level of detail pro-
vided by tax records and administrative datasets, it be-
came possible to say something robust about the su-
per-rich beyond unempirical Marxist concepts or anec-
dotal evidence provided by the press. 
Finally, the great virtue of this approach lies in 
its proximity to ordinary people’s understanding of 
inequality. The sentence “In 20 years, the top one per-
cent increased its share of the national income from 
8% to 14%” is much more concrete and easier for 
non-statisticians to understand than “the Gini coeffi-
cient increased from 0.33 to 0.38”. The affluence share 
of the top one percent is much simpler to calculate 
than full distribution coefficients, and it reintroduces 
“real people” into the measure of inequality. The top 
one percent can be thought of as a group of persons 
that compete with other persons for the appropria-
tion of the value created. This decomposition can eas-
ily fuel the view that “the misfortune of the little peo-
ple makes the fortune of the great men” – a judgment 
which encapsulates the principles of exploitation ac-
cording to Boltanski and Chiapello (2006, 375). This 
may be exactly why the 2011 #Occupy! movement was 
so prompt to adopt those statistical concepts as slo-
gans, sometimes along with a Piketty-Saez graph on 
their T-shirts. “We are the 99%!” combined the uni-
versal “We the People” of the Founding Fathers of the 
United States Constitution with the “Us versus them!” 
(99% versus 1%) logic of many class struggles.
The top one percent 
and concepts of the 
upper classes
The concept of the top one percent (or the top 0.1% or 
0.01%) identified by the Piketty et al. approach has in-
creasingly became equated with a kind of social class. 
This equation has not only been adopted by new so-
cial protests keen on naming an enemy, but also by 
the social sciences beyond economics, especially soci-
ology and political science, as a complement to and 
even a substitute for traditional ways of designating 
the highest group in the affluence hierarchy. Figure 2 
shows clearly that upper-percentile groups have be-
come a challenge for class theories. Traditional no-
tions such as “capitalists,” “bourgeoisie,” and “upper 
classes” were clearly dominant at the beginning of the 
twentieth century for thinking the gap between the 
top and the bottom (Figure 2). Their popularity de-
clined sharply after the 1970s, however, and fractiles 
of affluence have been gaining ground in academic 
discourse ever since. Why do these statistical ranking 
measures have so much appeal?
On the one hand, the conceptual limits of frac-
tiles are quite straightforward. The top one percent, 
especially the top one percent of the income hierar-
chy, mixes heterogeneous people in terms of their re-
lationship to employment (employers and employ-
ees), position in the hierarchy (executives, managers, 
and experts, on the one hand, and those with no hier-
archical power, such as rank-and-file traders, on the 
other), expertise (experts and, for example, profes-
sional athletes), type of income (wages and property 
income), age (retired people and active workers), and 
so on. Depending on the way income is defined and 
measured (i.e., individual or household income), the 
threshold is arbitrary and artificially creates a group 
within a continuum. People are not conscious of be-
ing part of this group, and others would not assign 
them to it without being told by social scientists what 
the relevant threshold is. In summary, we find neither 
objective nor subjective grounds for treating this sta-
tistical group as a solid social category. 
On the other hand, despite the analytical clarity 
of various class schemes, their concrete application is 
not immune to the criticisms raised against the con-
cept of the top one percent. In Capital, building on 
Smith and Ricardo’s labor theory of value, Marx puts 
the opposition between the capitalists, who own the 
means of production, and the proletariat, which pos-
sesses nothing but its labor power, at the heart of his 
class analysis (Marx [1867] 1887). Even in the late 
nineteenth century, the empirical application of this 
functional class analysis generated many doctrinal, 
theoretical, and political debates, especially regarding 
the class position of the growing intermediate strata 
of wage earners. Moreover, even class identification 
among capitalists, one of the core aspects of Erik Olin 
Wright’s class scheme (Wright 1997), faces many 
problems. Since class assignation rests on occupation, 
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it is not well equipped to handle the twentieth centu-
ry’s separation of ownership and control – or wage 
earners’ growing “capitalist” involvement through di-
rect savings and pension funds. The delimitation of a 
group of entrepreneurs heading firms with more than 
10 employees is at best a highly imperfect proxy for 
the capitalist class. Not only is this group becoming 
increasingly smaller, and therefore hardly useful for 
class analysis in most limited-size surveys, but it also 
consists mainly of entrepreneurs heading small and 
medium-sized firms. In the end, it represents mainly 
the upper fraction of the petty bourgeoisie. 
 Similarly, many class schemes make an impor-
tant distinction between managerial power and ex-
pertise (Wright 1997; Erikson and Goldthorpe, 
2002). However, when they approach the wage-earn-
ing upper strata empirically, this distinction is less 
useful, especially with the flattening of hierarchies in 
the service sector. The sociocultural proximity of 
managers and experts and the high 
level of mobility between the two 
groups have led both class theorists 
(Erikson and Goldthorpe, 2002; 
Bourdieu, 1984; Desrosières and 
Thévenot, 1988) and applied research-
ers to merge the two groups into a sin-
gle category. Hence, we end up with a 
large “upper class” consisting of en-
trepreneurs, executives, managers, 
experts, professors, and public-sector 
officers that – depending on the pre-
cise boundaries, the country, and the 
period – accounts for 5% to 20% of 
the population. While this grouping 
can make sense in order to capture 
the symbolic (and conflicting) roles 
these people play in defining the val-
ues that dominate the social order 
(Bourdieu, 1984), it lacks the preci-
sion and homogeneity necessary to 
measure economic inequality. 
Moreover, the size of this group 
has changed substantially over time. 
In France, managers and professionals 
(Cadres et professions intellectuelles 
supér ieures) doubled in size in thirty 
years, from 8% of the employed labor 
force in 1982–1984 to 16% in 2012–
2014. Measuring inequality through 
the differential of incomes and out-
comes (promotions, social mobility, 
and so on) between this group and 
blue-collar workers requires some 
way of normalizing the growing size of this elite. Odds 
ratios and log-linear models may do a reasonable job 
of solving this problem, but only under the question-
able hypothesis of nominal stability: in such models, a 
manager in 1982 is ipso facto considered equivalent to 
a manager in 2012. 
In contrast, the use of affluence fractiles is 
much simpler and provides much greater robustness 
to longitudinal and cross-country comparisons. 
Positing a categorical equivalence between the top 
one percent of two countries or two periods appears 
to be a much more reasonable first-order proxy than 
using social classifications that are ultimately de-
rived from historically and nationally defined occu-
pational groups (Thévenot and Desrosières 1988). 
Therefore, the use of stable fractions of a given hier-
archy makes it much easier to determine whether 
the top and the bottom are diverging, converging, or 
staying about the same. 
Inequality: A Piketty et al. Moment in the Social Sciences by Olivier Godechot 4
economic sociology_the european electronic newsletter Volume 19 · Number 1 · November 2017
Baseline
1 
10 
100 
1 000 
10 000 
100 000 
1 000 000 
10 000 000 
1901-
1910
1911-
1920
1921-
1930
1931-
1940
1941-
1950
1951-
1960
1961-
1970
1971-
1980
1981-
1990
1991-
2000
2001-
2010
2011-
2020*
Decade of publicationN
um
be
r o
f r
ef
er
en
ce
s 
lis
te
d 
in
 G
oo
gl
e 
S
ch
ol
ar
 (A
ug
us
t 2
5,
 2
01
7)
 
Inequality AND (income OR wealth OR fortune OR capital OR wage OR salary OR pay)
… AND capitalists
… AND bourgeoisie
… AND ("upper class" OR "upper classes")
… AND elite
… AND  "service class"
… AND  ("managers and professionals" OR "managers-professionals")
… AND share AND  ("top 1 percent" OR "top one percent" OR "top 1%") 
… AND share AND  ("top 0.1 percent" OR "top 0.1%") 
Piketty & Saez (2001)
Piketty (2001)
Figure 2. Categorical concepts used to approach inequality
Note and source: I collected the number of references published each decade that are listed on 
Google Scholar. I used the keywords inequality AND (income OR wealth OR fortune OR capital OR 
wage OR salary OR pay) as the baseline search, to which I added various categorical concepts 
to designate the upper strata. Hence, the Google Scholar search for the bourgeoisie” was 
inequality AND (income OR wealth OR fortune OR capital OR wage OR salary OR pay) AND share AND 
bourgeoisie.
I discuss the advantages and limitations of the Google Scholar database in the note in Figure 1.
* The number of references for the full decade 2011–2020 has been estimated by multiplying the 
actual number of publications for 2011–August 2017 (6.5 years) by 1.54 (=10/6.5).
Moreover, while Piketty et al. began by focusing 
on the top of the income hierarchy, the approach has 
now diversified to include analyses of the top of the 
wage and wealth hierarchies as well. One could argue 
that the upper hundredth (and especially the upper 
thousandth) of wealth (Saez and Zucman, 2016) is a 
better proxy for “capitalists” than “entrepreneurs head-
ing firms with 10 or more employees.” Along these 
lines, one could imagine a top one percent of the con-
trol hierarchy or a top one percent of cultural capital, 
making it possible to renew the tools for sound social, 
longitudinal, and cross-national comparisons.
The top one percent 
and economic sociology
My argument could lead us to conclude that this 
Piketty et al. moment constitutes a challenge and a 
ground- breaking shift primarily for class theorists 
and specialists in the measurement of inequality. At 
first glance, it would appear to pose less of a challenge 
to economic sociology, which focuses mainly on mar-
kets and their embeddedness in society, be it a net-
work embeddedness, or a cultural, an institutional, or 
a paradigmatic one (Granovetter, 1985; Zelizer, 1997; 
Fligstein, 1990; Callon, 1998). However, showing the 
various ways concrete market exchanges may differ 
from the Walrasian model is directly linked to the is-
sue of inequality. If equivalents are not exchanged for 
their equivalents by anonymous and powerless actors, 
then markets are no longer neutral. Inequality can be 
viewed both as a cause and a consequence of econom-
ic exchange. The link to distributional inequality is 
most obvious for research into labor markets: social 
capital, the Matthew effect, exploitation, opportunity 
hoarding, organizational resources, and hold-up 
power challenge the traditional view of the labor mar-
ket as a neutral alignment of human capital, produc-
tivity, and wages (Lin et al., 1981; DiPrete et al., 2010; 
Goldstein, 2012; Avent-holt and Tomaskovic-Devey, 
2014; Godechot, 2017). Moreover, inequality does 
play a key role in some general economic sociologies 
of the market. For instance, the field approach to eco-
nomic exchange developed by Bourdieu (2005) and 
Fligstein and McAdam (2012) puts the inequality of 
resources at the core of the model. Actors with the 
most resources enjoy higher returns within a field due 
to the legitimacy they have garnered to define the 
rules of the game. Among firms, strong status hierar-
chies also determine exchange opportunities, prices, 
and profit and shape the distribution of value added 
(Podolny, 2005). New forms of classification based on 
digital socio-technical devices (such as the FICO 
score) both challenge and amplify traditional hierar-
chies and invisibly exclude the poor and minorities 
from essential goods and services (Fourcade and 
Healy, 2013).
The Piketty et al. moment has created an oppor-
tunity to amplify economic sociology’s concern for 
inequality. First, it provides a battery of tools to ro-
bustly measure the long-term evolution of inequality 
in many countries. Second, those measures can in 
turn serve as either dependent or independent varia-
bles. To summarize, Piketty et al. have mainly meas-
ured inequality in various ways; the point now is to 
explain its origins and grapple with its consequences. 
Understanding concrete market mechanisms is vital 
to this process, and economic sociology can provide 
the means to do so.
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